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Abstract
Background: In the last decade, almost every low- or middle-income country in the world has expressed support
for universal health coverage (UHC). While at the beginning of the UHC movement, country strategies focused on
increasing access to the formal sector as the first step of UHC, there is now consensus that countries should cover
the entire population, with particular attention to covering the poor. However, it is often assumed that mandatory
schemes will automatically cover their target populations, and consequently little is known about why firms comply
or do not comply with enrolment requirements.
Using the experience of Lao PDR, where the enrolment rate in the mandatory social security scheme is low and the
capacity for regulation is weak, we conducted this study to better understand the determinants of enrolment of
private sector firms in mandatory social security.
Methods: We used a cross-sectional case-comparison design, surveying 130 firms. We applied a structured
questionnaire to explore determinants of enrolment, specifically looking at firm characteristics (e.g., industry
category, ownership); sociodemographic characteristics of company heads; firms’ risk perceptions; details of
employment contracts; employee benefits; and exposure to social security. Closed ended questions were
analysed quantitatively, while content analysis was applied to open-ended questions. Logistic regression was
used to examine the determinants of enrolment.
Results: Smaller privately owned firms in the services industry were the least likely to enrol in social security, while
firms in the trade industry were more likely to enrol than firms in manufacturing, construction, or services. The main
reason for not enrolling was that firms offered a better package of benefits to their employees, although
further investigation of company benefits showed that this was not the case in practice. Additional reasons
for non-compliance were lack of knowledge and poor quality of care at government hospitals.
Conclusions: The study contributes to the dialogue on how best to increase coverage in the formal sector,
which is an important element of achieving UHC. It also provides much needed information about the motivation of
private sector firms to comply with mandatory schemes.
Keywords: Health insurance, Social security, Social health insurance, Private sector, Lao PDR, South-east Asia
Background
In the last decade, low- and middle-income countries
have made considerable progress towards the goal of
universal health coverage (UHC). While each country’s
pathway toward UHC depends on the historical struc-
ture of the health care financing system, there is an
expectation that in countries with mandatory social
health insurance (SHI) for the private sector, increasing
coverage of SHI will be fairly straightforward given the
relative ease with which contributions can be collected
and employees can be identified. However, in reality,
many countries face challenges enrolling formal private
sector firms, even where enrolment is mandatory.
This study explores the case of Lao PDR where a
social security scheme for formal private sector firms
was introduced in 1999. As in many countries, the social
security scheme in Lao PDR includes health and non-
health benefits, and covers employees of private compan-
ies (including previously owned state-owned enterprises)
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and their dependents. Because the social security scheme
is mandatory and includes a SHI component, the Govern-
ment of Lao PDR views enrolment in social security as an
important pathway towards achieving universal health
coverage. However, despite its mandatory nature, the
social security scheme has suffered from low coverage.
This low coverage is due to two major factors: a small
proportion of private sector firms have been targeted for
enrolment; and within the target group, few firms comply
with the mandatory enrolment law. Among the firms
targeted, there is little understanding as to which firms
enrol, and which firm characteristics are associated with
enrolment. If the Government of Lao PDR is to make
progress in expanding health coverage through social
security, a greater understanding is needed about the
factors influencing enrolment in the scheme.
This study explores the firm-level determinants of
enrolment in social security. The study also examines
several other aspects of enrolment, including the motiv-
ation of employers to enrol/not enrol in social security,
firms’ experiences with the scheme, and the extent to
which firms are employing strategies to evade social
security contributions. The findings from the analysis
shed light on the prospects for expanding coverage of
social security in Lao PDR and other countries facing
challenges of getting the private sector to enrol in
mandatory SHI or social security schemes.
Review of the literature
There has been little study of the factors affecting the
decision to enrol in social security or social health insur-
ance at the firm level, probably because the mandatory
nature of such schemes theoretically eliminates the
decision-making process. However, in reality, most devel-
oping countries face difficulty getting the formal sector to
enrol in SHI: compliance is low, enforcement is weak, and
several evasion tactics are commonly used [1, 2]. It is
therefore useful to know why some firms comply with
mandatory insurance policies, while others do not. Three
bodies of literature shed light on the factors affecting
firms’ enrolment in insurance.
Studies examining compliance with social security
offer some insight into firms’ compliance with social
security laws, but typically focus on how and why firms
evade contributions [1–6]. One study from Shanghai
examined the factors affecting compliance with social
security. The study used a dataset of 2,200 firms to
explore the determinants of enrolment and found that
larger firms and firms in the real estate or construction
industries were less likely to comply with social security
obligations, but that a firm’s risk profile, i.e. how danger-
ous the business is, was not associated with compliance.
Literature on private employer-based health care in the
United States (US) offers insight into firms’ preferences
for employer-based health insurance, although the mech-
anism for insuring these firms is voluntary. This body of
literature is relevant because enrolment in social security
is effectively “voluntary” in countries where enforcement
is weak. A 2004 review [7] summarized much of the
literature in this area and showed that the following
types of firm were more likely to provide health insur-
ance: unionized firms; firms in the manufacturing in-
dustry [8]; larger firms; firms with higher wage workers
[9]; and firms with lower staff turnover rates and age
heterogeneity [10].
Finally, a third body of literature looks at reasons for
participating in formal schemes, defining formality as
the decision to participate in societal institutions, e.g.,
national and local treasuries; governmental programs;
banking systems; trade organizations; social security; etc.
Levenson and Maloney (1988) offer a framework for
explaining when and how institutions will participate in
societal institutions [11]. Using data from urban firms in
Mexico they showed that larger (measured by reve-
nues) and older firms were more likely to register with
the federal treasury, the social security administration
(IMSS), and to be enumerated in the Census of firms.
A study from Peru supports these findings, although
does not specifically examine participation in social
security [12].
In summary, these bodies of evidence shed light on
factors that are likely to shape firms’ decision to enroll
in social security, but there is still little known about
the determinants of enrolment in social security at the
firm level.
The setting
Like most other low- and middle-income country gov-
ernments, the Government of Laos is moving towards
universal health coverage. The health financing strategy
outlines a plan to expand coverage through four
schemes: the civil servants’ State Authority for Social Secur-
ity (SASS); a mandatory Social Health Insurance scheme
for private and state-owned enterprises, run by the Social
Security Organization (SSO); voluntary community-based
health insurance (CBHI) for the informal sector and
self-employed workers; and health equity funds (HEFs)
for households living in extreme poverty. Additionally,
the government subsidizes care and has been piloting a
free maternal health care initiative for women and
children 5 years of age and younger. However, health
insurance coverage in the country is still low: in 2011,
only 18.5 % of the population was enrolled in health
insurance [13]. For the remainder of the population,
they either pay out-of-pocket for health care, or forego
care altogether. The challenges of expanding health
insurance coverage in Lao PDR have been discussed
elsewhere, but include a small formal sector, challenges
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getting informal sector households to enroll in CBHI;
lack of trust in the health care system; and other
factors [14, 15].
The Social Health Insurance scheme is part of a larger
social security program targeting employees in the
private formal sector (including previously state-owned
enterprises) and their dependents. The scheme is managed
by the SSO - a semi-autonomous organization within the
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, and is financed
through a combination of employee and employer contri-
butions.1 The full package of social security benefits
includes medical care, paid sick leave, paid maternity
leave, death benefits, employment injury or occupational
disease benefits, retirement pensions, life insurance, and
disability insurance. Upon enrolment in social security, a
firm is automatically enrolled in the various social security
benefits and therefore, enrolment in social health insur-
ance is linked to enrolment in the other benefit packages
by design. However, the health care fund, which also
receives government subsidies, is the largest benefit and
finances outpatient and inpatient care, and prescription
drugs available at hospitals. There are no co-payments or
limits on the number of contacts or services provided.
Public providers are paid by capitation, which, at the time
of the study, was fixed at LAK 80,000 (US$ 9.40) per
insured person per year [16].
Although enrolment in social security was mandatory
for all enterprises with at least 10 employees at the time
of the study, coverage has remained low since the
scheme’s inception.2 Low enrolment can be attributed, at
least in part, to the small scale of the formal sector
(roughly 5 % of the population), limited geographic
reach of the scheme (4 provinces only), lack of enforce-
ment and weak regulatory structure, and limited capacity
of the SSO to attract new members through scheme
promotion. Despite the mandatory law, there has been
little enforcement of the scheme [17]. The lack of
enforcement is due to a variety of factors. First, until
recently, enrolment was mandated through a Ministerial
decree (SSO Decree 207), which is weaker than a law
promulgated by the President. Second, there are no regu-
latory procedures to enact penalties for non-compliant
firms. Although an inspection unit at SSO was introduced
in 2008 with a mandate of identifying non-compliant
enterprises, at the time of the study, only verbal warnings
could be issued. Furthermore, the SSO office has trad-
itionally been understaffed, with very little capacity to
carry out inspections. As a step to strengthening the regu-
latory framework around social security, the SSO promul-
gated a law specific to social security in 2013 and it was
implemented in 2014. However, it is not clear to what
extent the new law is enforced or whether regulatory pro-
cedures, including penalties for non-compliance, accom-
pany the new law. In summary, the lack of enforcement of
social security at the time of the study made compliance
with the scheme somewhat “voluntary” for firms, justifying
the need to understand the factors affecting enrolment.
Methods
We used a cross-sectional case-comparison design of
130 firms, of which 65 were enrolled and 65 non-
enrolled. The study was conducted in Vientiane Capital,
the province with the highest concentration of formal
sector enterprises. A structured questionnaire with both
closed- and open-ended questions was administered to
employers. Other methods were employed to help set
the context for the study and to shed light on the po-
tential for expanding coverage. These methods include:
reviews of legislation and documents; key informant
interviews with SSO staff members and private em-
ployers; secondary data analysis of the Lao Economic
Census; and Excel projections of coverage expansion.
The purpose of the interviews with SSO staff members
was to learn more about the scheme, its implementa-
tion, and the SSO; to identify the optimal sampling
frame for the study; and to better understand how the
target group for the scheme was defined. Private em-
ployer interviews helped to understand the factors
influencing enrolment in social security. This pre-
survey work was exploratory in nature and no formal
methods were used to analyse findings.
Sample selection
We used the list of firms maintained by the SSO, herein
referred to as the SSO database, as the sampling frame
for this study. We restricted the sample to firms in
Vientiane Capital, as they represent the large majority of
the firms in the sampling frame. This restricted sampling
frame included 1320 firms (388 member and 932 non-
member firms). We randomly selected 130 employers
(including 65 member firms and 65 non-member firms)
from the four biggest industries in the SSO target group:
manufacturing; construction; trade; and services, using
stratified random sampling, stratifying by industry and
firm size (10–19 employees; 20–49 employees; 50–99
employees; and 100 or more employees), making a total
of 16 strata in the SSO-member group and 16 strata in
the non-member group. Selecting a subsample of indus-
tries is consistent with the methodology used in the
World Bank Enterprise Surveys [18]. Once the firms
were selected, they were contacted by telephone to re-
quest participation in the survey. Following acceptance,
an appointment was made for a face-to-face interview. If
the prospective interviewee was not available, the inter-
viewers called back up to three times to reschedule the
appointment. If firms refused, a replacement firm was
selected from the same stratum, to ensure that 65 firms
in each group (SSO and non-SSO) were interviewed.
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It is important to note that the SSO sample repre-
sents only a fraction of firms that should be eligible
for social security in Laos because the SSO obtains
its list of target firms from the central Tax Registra-
tion office, which does not include all firms in the
country. For example, some firms that are “formal”
(i.e., they pay taxes and have a permanent location),
pay taxes to other entities and are therefore not tar-
geted by the SSO. Additionally, the Labor Law man-
dates enrolment of social security but for “all firms
with at least one or more employees”. These smaller
or less formalized firms were not targeted by the SSO
at the time of the study [19].
Data collection
A structured questionnaire was administered to heads
of companies, i.e., chief executive officer, director,
general manager, etc. where possible. Closed-ended
questions were designed to capture variables that are
expected to influence enrolment in social security,
including: characteristics of businesses (industry cat-
egory, ownership, company size, revenues, percentage
of permanent employees, percentage of female work-
force, age distribution, number of service outlets/
branches, membership of a business organization, and
level where tax payment is made); sociodemographic
characteristics of heads of company (education, age,
nationality, gender); risk perceptions of firms; details
of employment contracts; employee benefits; and
awareness of, and experience with, social security. For
some questions, employers were asked to obtain infor-
mation from company records if available, e.g., the
number of employees by employment contract; and
the amount paid to social security and other benefits.
Open-ended questions were also included in the ques-
tionnaire to capture qualitative information that could
be used to help interpret findings.
A local research team was hired to carry out data
collection. The questionnaire and study protocol were
approved by the SSO and ethical approval was granted
by the National Institute of Public Health in Laos and
the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
in the United Kingdom. Pilot-testing took place in
February 2009 and field work took place from March
through May 2009.
Analysis
Analysis of quantitative information from the closed-
ended questions was performed in Stata 10.0. Much of
the data analysis was descriptive but a logit model was
used to understand the determinants of enrolment.
The logit model is represented by the following equa-
tion, where PSS represents the probability of enrolling
in social security:
PSS ¼ 1= 1þ eð Þ− b0þb1þX1þb2X2þ⋯bnXnþεð Þ
The dependent variable (social security enrolment)
takes on a value of 1 for a firm enrolled with social
security and 0 for a non-enrolled firm. X1 through Xn
represent characteristics of firms and of company heads;
bi represents the coefficient for the respective X variable;
and ε represents the error term, which includes unob-
served variables. The logit model is used to estimate the
odds ratios, which represent the odds that a firm will
enrol in social security given a certain characteristic,
when other covariates are held constant. The odds of
enrolling in social security are given by the notation
below:
OR ¼ PSS
1‐PSS
Sampling weights were applied to the logit model to
account for the stratified random sampling approach.
The post-survey weighting adjusts for the probability
that the firm was selected and also accounts for the
refusal rates.3 This post-survey weighting restores the
proportions in the sample to the proportions in the SSO
sampling frame [20]. Tests for collinearity among in-
dependent variables were performed in Stata and are
presented with the results.
As is often the case with firm surveys, the refusal rate
was quite high.4 Among the firms that were contacted,
20 % declined to participate in the survey, although there
was no significant difference in participation between
member and non-member groups. In an additional 13
% of firms, the interview could not be successfully ar-
ranged (after attempting to follow-up or re-schedule
three times). Therefore we replaced a total of 33 % of
the sample (43 out of the 130 firms) using the original
sampling approach.
Qualitative information from open-ended responses
was first translated and transcribed and then coded in
Excel. Findings were analysed using thematic analysis
[21, 22] and were used to help interpret and validate the
quantitative results.
Results
Determinants of enrolment in social security
Background characteristics of sample
Table 1 outlines background characteristics of the sam-
ple by insurance status. Significantly more SSO member
firms were state-owned, and under foreign ownership or
mixed ownership, while the majority of uninsured firms
were domestically owned. SSO member firms also had a
significantly larger workforce relative to their non-
member counterparts but there was no significant differ-
ence in gender balance or the proportion of permanent
employees. Although similar with respect to assets, a
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Table 1 Background characteristics of sample
Firm characteristics SSO (n = 65) Non-SSO (n = 65) p-value
Industry category (% of firms)
Manufacturing 45.9 29.0 0.0084**
Construction 2.4 24.0
Trade 17.7 10.6
Services 34.1 36.5
Total 100 100
Ownership (private/state)
Ownership 1: State-owned or partially state-owned (ref = 100 % private) 24.7 2.5 0.005**
Ownership 2 (% of firms):
100 % domestic 53.3 88.2 0.001**
100 % foreign 24.3 9.4
Mixed partnership (domestic & foreign) 22.4 2.4
Total 100 100
Employees
Mean # of permanent employees 144.11 53.01 0.068*
Mean # of temp employees 55.53 8.98 0.071*
Mean # of daily wage employees 5.41 1.21 0.121
Permanent employees as a % of workforce 78.3 76.7 0.230
% of workforce female 37.7 38.8 0.856
Size of company (financial)
Company Assets (2008) (%)
< 1 billion kip 31.3 35.0 0.184
1-10 billion kip 43.1 53.3
> 10 billion kip 25.6 11.7
Company Revenues (2008) (%)
< 1 billion kip 31.9 54.7 0.036**
1-10 billion kip 40.5 36.1
> 10 billion kip 28.0 9.2
Other firm characteristics (%)
>1 service outlet/factor/branch/store 71.8 79.1 0.429
Member of business organization 55.8 29.8 0.011**
Higher than average risk 12.7 16.1 0.628
Age distribution (at least 70 % of employees are <35 years) 67.4 69.1 0.868
Mean company turnover (annual) 8.5 8.5 0.982
Level of tax payment
central 48.2 20.1 0.011**
provincial 40.9 46.2
district 11.0 34.0
Characteristics of company head (%)
Nationality (head is Laotian) 64.0 86.8 0.008**
Mean age (years) 51.8 49.3 0.307
Gender (head is male) 85.3 76.7 0.296
Education of head (attended university/college or higher) 86.3 57.6 0.003**
**significant at 5 %; *significant at 10 %. Reported results are based on t-tests of means for continuous variables and chi-squares for proportions/categorical variables.
All estimates are weighted to account for design effect and non-response
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higher proportion of SSO member firms had higher
company revenues, were more likely to be members of
a business organization, to have company heads who
are foreign-born, and to have attended post-secondary
education.
Which employer characteristics are associated with
enrolment in social security?
The relationship between firm characteristics and enrol-
ment in social security, when all other factors are held
constant, are presented as odds ratios in Table 2. The
odds of enrolling were significantly higher for firms in
the trade industry relative to the services industry. Own-
ership was also associated with enrolment: the odds of
enrolling were approximately 16 times higher for state-
owned enterprises than for private firms, which is not
surprising given that social security is a government-
mandated program.5 Although foreign owned companies
were not significantly more likely to enroll, the odds of a
mixed company (where ownership is shared between
domestic and foreign owners) enrolling was 24 times
greater than the odds of a domestic company enrolling.
It is possible that mixed companies, due to the nature of
their business, receive pressure to comply with industry
regulations, or that these types of firms have a stronger
compliance culture.
Prior to the interviews, key informants reported that
they expected enrolment to be higher for larger firms. The
study confirmed that larger firms (at least 60 employees),
were three times more likely to enroll than smaller firms
(less than 20 employees). However, a firm’s decision to en-
roll was not significantly influenced by the firm’s financial
status, perceived risk, number of service outlets, the hiring
of temporary workers or employee turnover. Although
key informants expected pressure from leaders of business
organizations to influence members to enrol in SSO, this
claim was not supported by the study findings. The find-
ings also show that the odds of enrolling was more than
three times higher in companies whose heads have a uni-
versity education or higher but nationality and gender had
no influence on enrolment.6
Descriptive findings about firms’ behaviour and
motivation
What motivates employers to enrol/not enrol in social
security?
To better understand employers’ decisions to enrol,
employers were asked to rate a number of possible
Table 2 Odds ratios of enrolment, by firm characteristic
Odds ratio St. error z-statistic p > |z|
Industry type (Reference group: services)
Manufacturing 1.149 0.769 0.21 0.836
Construction 0.256 0.275 −1.27 0.205
Trade 4.469 3.371 1.99 0.047**
Ownership 1: State-owned or partially state-owned (ref: 100 % private) 16.891 19.578 2.44 0.015**
Ownership 2: (Reference group: 100 % domestic)
100 % foreign (vs. domestic) 6.782 10.141 1.28 0.201
mixed (vs. domestic) 24.020 23.557 3.24 0.001***
Size of permanent workforce =20-59 employees (ref: 0–19 emp) 1.492 0.960 0.62 0.535
Size of permanent workforce = 60+ employees (ref: 0–19 emp) 3.296 2.308 1.7 0.088*
Revenues (Reference group: <1 billion kip)
1-10 billion Kip 1.437 0.788 0.66 0.508
> 10 billion Kip 1.210 0.913 0.25 0.800
Firm has higher than avg perceived risk (3+ on a scale of 1–5) 0.621 0.635 −0.47 0.641
More than one service outlet/branch/factor/store 1.357 0.856 0.48 0.629
Member of business organization (ref: no membership) 1.945 1.048 1.23 0.217
Employs any temporary workers 1.195 0.653 0.33 0.744
At least 10 % employee turnover (annually) 0.476 0.280 −1.26 0.207
Taxes paid at central level (ref: taxes paid at lower levels) 0.743 0.522 −0.42 0.672
Head of company is Laotian (vs. foreign) 2.178 2.590 0.65 0.513
Head of company has a university education or higher 3.426 1.821 2.32 0.021**
Head of company is male 0.626 0.404 −0.73 0.468
*significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; ***significant at 1 %
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reasons for enrolment/ non-enrolment on a scale of
one to five, with one being not at all important and five
being very important.7 The results, summarized in Table 3,
confirm the trends identified through multivariate analysis
but also shed further light on employers’ decision-making
process. Among the insured, the most important reason
for enrolment was to ensure employees are covered with
health insurance. Increasing employee satisfaction, and
improving the health and well-being of employees were
also important factors. These findings indicate that em-
ployers were most concerned with the health insurance
benefits within the social security scheme. In another
survey question, respondents ranked health care as the
most important benefit, followed by retirement benefits
and sick leave. The finding that pressure from the SSO
was not an important factor was not surprising given that
SSO is not currently enforcing enrolment.
Among the non-enrolled cohort of the sample, the most
important reason for non-enrolment was that the com-
pany’s benefit package is superior to social security. Other
important reasons for not enrolling were: employers’ lack
of knowledge of social security; the poor quality of govern-
ment hospitals; and the fact that employees do not use
benefits or do not get sick.
To better understand the process by which a firm
decides to enrol in social security, employers were
asked to identify the people in charge of making the
decision to enrol. Most firms mentioned that the
director of the company, the general manager or the
owner, and less often the executive board, make the
decision to enrol. In a few companies, the personnel
manager and all staff members were involved in the
decision process.
Is the benefit package offered by non-member firms
comparable to social security benefits?
As stated earlier, the most important reason for not
enrolling in social security was that employers offer a
better package of benefits than that offered by the SSO.
However, the study findings show that the non-enrolled
firms offer far fewer benefits to their employees than do
SSO member firms (See Fig. 1). In fact, the majority of
non-enrolled employers did not offer health care bene-
fits: only one quarter of non-enrolled firms made direct
payments for employees’ health care, while none had
private insurance. In contrast, some SSO member firms
offered extra insurance for programs that were already
included in the social security package (e.g., private health
insurance, maternity benefits, coverage for injuries, and
sick leave). Thus, SSO member employers offered more
generous benefit packages to their employees.
With respect to temporary employees, very few in either
group received employee benefits. However, among SSO
member firms, 20 % offered social security and 23 % paid
annual leave to their temporary employees. According to
employers, the length of time an employee can work as a
temporary employee varies across firms, and 30 % of firms
report that there is no limit. Because the majority of
temporary employees do not receive benefits, there may
be a financial incentive for employers to hire temporary
Table 3 Most important reasons for enrolment/ non-enrolment
Reasons for enrolment Rating (1–5)a
To ensure employees have health care coverage 4.28
To increase employee satisfaction 4.11
To improve health and well-being of employees 4.08
To ensure employees have retirement benefits 4.00
Strong pressure from international bodies 3.05
Strong pressure from Social Security
Organization (SSO)
2.74
Strong pressure from employees 2.72
Strong pressure from membership organization 2.71
Reasons for non-enrolment Rating (1–5)a
Company benefits are better than social security
(SS) benefits
4.11
Do not know much about social security 3.42
Quality of government hospitals not good 3.22
Do not use health care benefits/ staff do
not get sick
3.22
Employees do not want SS 3.12
Cost of SSO is too high 2.97
Do not trust that money is used well 2.83
High turnover among employees 2.57
Many temporary employees 2.38
Employees prefer to purchase private insurance 2.35
aRatings were applied using a likert scale, with 1 being least important and
5 being most important
Fig. 1 Benefits offered to SSO and non-SSO employees
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employees to fulfil the duties of permanent employees.
The potential for such evasion is discussed in the
next section.
Are member firms employing strategies to evade social
security contributions?
As stated in the literature review, one of the challenges
of implementing and enforcing mandatory insurance is
evasion of contributions. In Lao PDR, it was expected
that any evasion tactics, such as underreporting the
number of employees, reclassifying job descriptions, etc.
would be minimal, given that penalties are not yet
enacted for non-compliance. Rather than employing
deliberate techniques to conceal the fact that they are
not enrolling, firms can simply not enrol without conse-
quences. However, one way to detect evasion is to exam-
ine the structure of the workforce. A high proportion of
temporary workers in non-enrolled firms relative to SSO
member firms could indicate that a firm is trying to
evade social security contributions by hiring temporary
workers, who do not usually receive benefits. Overall,
SSO member firms were no more likely than non-
enrolled firms to employ temporary workers: in both
groups permanent employees represent slightly more
than three quarters of the workforce. After controlling
for type of industry (See Fig. 2), the difference in the
proportion of permanent workers between SSO enrolled
and non-enrolled firms is small and not significant in
three employment categories. However, in the services
industry, SSO member firms employed significantly
fewer permanent workers, relative to uninsured firms.
Even when differences in the size of workforce, revenues,
and ownership (private vs. state-owned; foreign vs.
domestic) are taken into account, significant differences
still remain. It is possible that firms in the service indus-
try are replacing permanent workers with temporary
workers as a means of evading social security payments.
We cannot ascertain from the data in Fig. 2 whether
all firms (not just SSO members) are evading payment
of benefits. The Labour Law requires all employers to
provide sick leave, maternity benefits, health care, occu-
pational disease benefits, and pensions for their perman-
ent workforce, irrespective of their social security status.
These expenses must be borne by the employer for firms
that do not have social security. Therefore, it is possible
that firms (both SSO members and non-members) hire
temporary workers, or under-report number of perman-
ent employees as a way of shirking the responsibility and
costs associated with purchasing employee benefits. Key
informant discussions with the SSO in the initial stages
of this study revealed that some companies’ reports on
the size of the permanent workforce gradually decline
over time when in fact, upon closer inspection by the
SSO, the number of employees remains constant. By
underreporting the number of employees, firms may feel
that both employers and employees benefit: firms de-
crease their indirect labour costs and employees may
be given the option of taking the foregone benefits as
cash [23].
Prior to the study, key informant interviews suggested
that some employers allow employees to opt-out of
social security. Given that social security is mandatory
for all permanent employees, opt-outs can be consid-
ered an evasion strategy used to reduce labour costs.
In the international literature, some of the reasons
given for evasion at the household or individual level
include: a desire to meet current consumption needs;
myopic behaviour; and lack of confidence in the scheme
(McGillivray, 2001). To further investigate the extent to
which opt-outs take place in the Lao social security
scheme, we compared data on the number of permanent
workers in the company (identified in a module on “em-
ployment contracts” in the survey) with the number of
permanent employees enrolled in social security (reported
in a second module on “employee benefits” later in the
survey). If firms are complying with social security, 100 %
of the permanent workforce should be enrolled. However,
the findings presented in Fig. 3 show that 44 % of member
firms enrolled less than 100 % of the permanent workforce
in the scheme. In fact, 94 % of employers with social
security benefits openly admitted to giving employees the
option to enrol.
Discussion
The background research and the findings from this
study contribute new evidence about the enrolment
operations of a mandatory social security scheme in
Laos and reveal several opportunities and barriers to
expanding SHI. Larger firms in the trade industry were
the most likely to enrol in social security. Additionally,
mixed ownership companies (where ownership is shared
Fig. 2 Composition of workforce by industry and SSO status
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between domestic and foreign owners) had a signifi-
cantly and substantially higher odds of enrolling than a
domestic company. Further investigation into whether
these mixed ownership companies receive pressure to
comply with industry regulations, or have a stronger
compliance culture, would help to explain these findings.
There was no association between firm enrolment and
the level of workplace risk and these findings are
consistent with a study in Shanghai, which explored the
relationship between firm characteristics and compliance
with social security [4].
The finding that companies with higher revenues were
more likely to enrol in social security may indicate that
social security is more affordable to these firms. Alterna-
tively, staff of larger firms could be more concerned that
they will be detected for non-compliance, which could
have implications for the company’s reputation even if
penalties are not enforced. Although SSO member firms
were more likely to have company heads who were more
educated or foreign-born, this relationship is unlikely to
be a causal relationship but rather to be due to an asso-
ciation with other omitted variables that make it more
likely for a firm to comply with the social security law.
The perspectives of employers help to pinpoint some
of the motivations for enrolling, or not enrolling, in
social security. Firms that enrol in social security are
concerned about their employees: employers want to
ensure their employees have health insurance; care about
employee satisfaction; and want to improve the health
and well-being of employees. Although health insurance
is the largest and most important benefit in the social
security scheme and is the biggest draw to the social
security scheme, retirement benefits and sick leave are
the second and third most important benefits, respect-
ively. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that, by
design, enrolment in SHI is linked to a broader package
of social security benefits and therefore decisions to
enrol in social security are determined by the perception
of the benefit package as a whole. A study that looked at
opportunities to expand social health insurance for
formal workers in Vietnam (which is also part of a larger
social security scheme) found that reforming pensions,
and possibly other benefits, would make social security
more attractive to private sector employers and could
facilitate the scheme’s expansion [24]. Thus, efforts to
move towards UHC may need to go beyond the health
sector in countries where social health insurance is
integrated with other non-health benefits.
The main reason given for not enrolling was that firms
offered a better package of benefits to their employees,
although this explanation is discordant with other evi-
dence showing that few non-member firms actually offer
benefits to their employees. Other important reasons for
not enrolling were that employers are not adequately
informed about social security. Although promotion
activities targeted at employers could help to encourage
enrolment, there are other barriers besides lack of know-
ledge of the scheme that prevent firms from enrolling.
For example, the third most important reason for not
enrolling is that the quality of government hospitals is
not good. Quality was mentioned elsewhere in the
survey as one of the major weaknesses of the social
security scheme and appears to be a common theme
affecting enrolment in health insurance in Laos. For
example, another study on enrolment in CBHI in Laos
suggests that quality of hospitals is an important factor
affecting enrolment [14]). Thus, it is likely that in the
absence of substantial improvements to the health care
system, poor quality of care will be a limiting factor in
expanding enrolment in all types of insurance – including
social security.
Given the problems of evasion documented in social
security schemes [1–3] this study explored whether or
not firms were evading social security benefits. The find-
ings indicate that there may be some evasion taking
place in the services industry, and it is possible that this
evasion behaviour is being practiced across all firms,
regardless of social security status. As the SSO strengthens
enforcement of enrolment, evasion of payments will likely
become a bigger concern that will require greater atten-
tion. Evasion can lead to a significant loss of revenues for
the government. For instance, in Colombia, evasion of
social security payments among formal sector workers
was estimated to cost US$836 million in forgone revenues
in a year (2.75 % of GDP) [25], while in the Philippines
and Kazakhstan, only 30 and 40 % of expected revenues
from social health insurance, respectively, were actually
collected [26, 27].
There are a number of limitations to the study. First, the
restriction of the sampling frame to one province and four
industries may limit the generalizability of the findings.
Second, given that questions about non-compliance with
social security are likely to be sensitive, some bias in this
Fig. 3 Percent of permanent workforce enrolled with SSO
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study, due to non-response and false-response, is ex-
pected, although response rates did not significantly differ
between the SSO member and non-member firms. It is
difficult to estimate the direction of the bias given that
detailed information about the firms that refused to
participate is not available. It is possible that the discus-
sion about enrolment in social security, particularly for
the non-compliant firms, was a sensitive topic and may
have prompted false responses.
Despite the limitations, the results provide evidence
regarding the perspectives of private sector employers – a
group that is not usually engaged in health sector reform
discussions. A number of issues emerge from the study
that suggest the need for operational changes that could
strengthen the scheme and facilitate expansion. For ex-
ample, introducing legislation for enforcing enrolment;
making the social security benefit package more attractive;
and building capacity within the SSO to stimulate and
enforce enrolment, could all be effective strategies to
ensuring firms enrol in social security. These recommen-
dations are discussed in more detail elsewhere [14, 19].
Additional strategies used internationally, such as issuing
warning letters, or benchmarking tax administration
across countries to increase accountability could also be
considered although approaches will need to be country
specific and priorities will differ across countries. It is
clear, however, that efforts to strengthen and expand the
reach of the social security scheme will require broader
changes to make progress towards UHC. For example,
there are high costs to stronger enforcement, as offices
will need to be established throughout the country and
infrastructure and legislation required for enforcement
will need to be developed. The costs would likely increase
considerably if the SSO begins targeting smaller and less
formal firms. Additionally, the forgone revenues associ-
ated with a potential increase in informality and evasion
must be considered.
Even if social security can play an important social
insurance role for the small but growing formal sector in
Laos, it is unlikely to be a vehicle for improving access
to health services, reducing health-related financial risk
on a broad basis, or generating substantial revenues for
the health sector. The scheme, which covered 1.5 % of
the population at the time of the study, and targets a
formal sector that is currently very small, has limited
potential for scale-up. The new Social Security law does
provide an option for the self-employed to enroll volun-
tarily but the literature on voluntary insurance shows
that such mechanisms are unlikely to achieve high
coverage rates. Thus, countries with social insurance
schemes that target a small formal sector will need
complementary approaches to help them achieve UHC.
In Lao PDR, there is scope for building on other health
protection schemes, including community-based health
insurance and health equity funds. Currently, the differ-
ent health protection schemes are highly fragmented,
although there are plans to merge all schemes into one
national social health insurance fund to pave the way for
UHC by 2020 [28]. Merging the schemes into one fund
would be an important step towards improved coordin-
ation and reduced administrative costs. Integration under
one organization could also increase purchasing power
and facilitate better supervision of quality. However,
given the current low coverage rates and the difficulty
of enforcing enrolment in the large informal sector, it is
unlikely that simply merging the schemes will facilitate
expansion of enrolment.
Conclusions
This study demonstrates the challenge of achieving UHC
through social health insurance in countries where the
formal sector is large and enforcement capacity is limited.
As Laos and other countries address the challenge of low
coverage, figuring out how to increase coverage should be
accompanied by efforts to improve the supply of health
care. Improving quality of health care is particularly im-
portant in Laos, where this study and others indicate
quality of care as a major reason for poor enrolment.
Quality improvements in Laos will therefore require
substantial public investment, along with efforts to
strengthen public financial management. Successful
pathways to UHC – in Laos and other countries - must
focus on the demand and supply side, to make sure
coverage is worth having and valued by beneficiaries.
Endnotes
1Employees and employers contribute 4.5 and 5 % of
employees’ salaries, respectively, up to an income ceiling
of LAK 1,500,000 ($175.00). Health insurance makes up
the largest fund, comprising 4.4 out of 9.5 percentage
points of an employee’s earnings.
2Less than 30 % of targeted firms are enrolled but only
a subsample of firms in the country have been targeted
given the way the SSO identifies and contacts its target
group. The SHI scheme covered approximately 1.5 % of
the population at the time of the study.
3Probability weights were calculated as the inverse of
the sampling probability multiplied by the response rate,
i.e., (# in the population/# in the sample) X (# sampled/#
refused + # sampled). Thus, the weights act as an inflation
factor to restore the strata in the sample to their respective
proportions in the sampling frame.
4The low response rate was expected given previous
difficulty of interviewing private sector employers in
Laos and because the initial point of contact was
through telephone.
5In this sample, all but one state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) or partially state-owned enterprises were enrolled
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in social security. Therefore, the effect of state-ownership
on enrollment is very strong. It is not clear whether there
is an additional mechanism for SOEs to enroll in social
security, but it is possible that SOEs are pressured to
enroll or are automatically enrolled.
6It was suspected that there was some collinearity
between nationality and education and between nation-
ality and ownership. However, tests for collinearity were
performed in Stata and all variance inflation factors were
low (below four). Following guidance in the UCLA Stata
help guide, a value lower than 10 is tolerated. Another
model was run without the Lao national dummy variable
but the significance of other variables did not change.
Thus, nationality was left in the model.
7The possible factors affecting enrolment/non-enrolment
were identified by first asking employers to list their most
important reasons for enrolling/not enrolling. Respondents
were then asked to rank the full list of responses.
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